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北京大学查道炯教授系列评论合集
时间:2018年04月03日 14:24来源: 点击数:

前言

查道炯,北京大学国际关系学院教授、www.3522com教授,于2007年9月开始在北京大学国际关系学院工作。他的教学和研究集中关注当代中外关系中在非传统安全领域的课题,包括能源、矿产、粮食、跨境水资源等。在地区/国别关系方面,他更关注中国与亚洲和太平洋地区其它国家间的互动,兼顾中国与欧洲、中国与非洲国家在经济领域的关系发展。他力图从与国际组织、政府机构、跨国企业的互动中汲取新知,努力为促进不同层面的中外务实交流做贡献。本文汇集查教授2018年部分精彩评论,以飨读者。

文章目录  

应对贸易战,要以“事”谋“势”(2018-04-02)

Kim Jong-un Visits Beijing (2018-03-28)

对特朗普政府宣布加征钢铝关税的点评(2018-03-16)

When Trump and Kim Meet, What Will Xi Do?(2018-03-13)

Is American Policy toward China Due for a ‘Reckoning’?(2018-02-15)

US defence strategy is not news to China (2018-02-11)

南海地区功能性合作——中国的视角(2018-01-31)

中美关系︱谁怕唐纳德?特朗普(2018-01-25) 

 

正  文

查道炯:应对贸易战,要以“事”谋“势” 

发表日期:2018-04-02     文章来源:北大国发院微信公众平台

发起贸易战是美国处理对外经济纠纷的常用手段,特朗普政府针对中国的做法,具有一定的历史周期性特朗普政府为什么执意要采用单边且激烈的方式来试图达到纠正中美贸易不平衡的目的?这是不是中美两国处于“修昔底德陷阱”的表征之一?其实,美国不是第一次使用这种方式了,发起这次贸易战也不完全是因为对手是中国。

 

正如刚才卢锋教授所说,包含“301条款”的《美国贸易法案》是在1974年通过的。比较有名的先例是80年初,里根总统用这个条款来处理与日本的贸易纠纷。今天,特朗普贸易政策的基调与里根执政初期有很大的相似性,贸易代表莱特希泽本人就是里根时期与日本谈判的主角。当时美国与日本贸易战的打法,和今天类似,也是聚焦在部分商品上,例如钢铁、机器工具、半导体、整车及零部件等,具体手段包括要求日本增加进口、设置进口配额清单、要求承诺自愿出口限制,此外,还联合其它主要经济体一起要求日本签订“广场协议”来迫使日元升值。

从美国与日本之间的贸易状况看,到80年代末,美国的逆差不但没有缩小,反而扩大了,亚太地区产业链使然。包括美国学者在内的不同国家的学者们也都指出,今天美国与中国之间贸易与当年的美日贸易,在本质上而言,并无不同。

那么,为什么美国还要发起贸易战呢?从国际政治的角度看,一个有力的解释是美国社会对国家在国际上的地位出现了不安的情绪。 70年代末,特别是伊朗人质事件(驻德黑兰使馆被伊朗学生占领,营救行动失败),“美国衰落”的情绪开始蔓延。在这种情绪中,日本被认为搭了美国的便车。今天也一样,越来越多的美国人回顾过去二十年,发现自己的国家花钱出力在中东、阿富汗等地的反恐过程,不仅屡屡受挫,甚至越反越恐;而中国在这一过程中集中精力发展经济,美国货物贸易总量被中国超过,经济总量不断被中国逼近,又一轮危机意识弥漫美国社会。在他们眼中,就全球竞争态势而言,中国虽然没有像当年日本那样搭美国的便车,但却钻了美国发展历程的空子。

在贸易议题上“敲打中国”,并不是特朗普执政的发明。例如,在奥巴马总统执政期间,2016年5月,就针对原产于中国的耐腐蚀钢征收过450%的关税。根据世贸组织网站所列的数据,奥巴马总统执政的8年期间,一共向WTO提起了25起诉讼,其中16起是针对中国的。到了特朗普总统,他认为WTO的多边贸易争端解决机制不足以有效地保护美国利益,已经收不到遏制住来自中国的产品进入美国市场的效果,所以,在美方看来,目前更高频、更精准的贸易战(威胁)是美国政策的自然延伸,也是不得以而为之。

有关贸易战的议论背后,反映出中、美主流地缘经济思维的差距越来越大这一思维的差距体现在很多方面。

首先是关于中国近几十年得以快速发展或者说崛起的原因现在美国大部分精英都认为中国的成功是由于美国给中国创造了有利的环境。他们常提到的“事实”有两个:二战后,美国在东北亚、南海-印度洋-中东运输通道驻军,为进出中国港口的商船提供了安全保障,此其一;没有美国的同意,中国就不可能加入WTO,而WTO成员国才是中国对外经济稳定增长的制度性保障,此其二。言下之意,中国非但没有感激美国,没履行其WTO承诺,反而在一些方面对美国发起了挑战。

针对这些议题,中国的主流地缘政治意识并不接受美国的军事存在和行为是对中国的利好的看法,而且明确反对那些有损中国的国家利益的行为。在中方看来,中国加入WTO,体现了世界需要中国、中国也需要世界这个历史性契合。针对特朗普政府明确地反对承认中国的“市场经济地位”,中国做的好不好应该由WTO评估来做,不应该由美国控制话语权。

其次是贸易制裁所伴随的政治意义从美国的视角来看,针对一个贸易伙伴的国内经济和政治安排提出要求,是对它负责任的做法(对中国也不例外),更是为全球谋利。在中方看来,美国拿贸易和投资准入条件来要求、规范中国具体的改革步伐,这是在干涉内政。

第三是国家间贸易与各自政治体制之间的关联在美国的地缘经济思维中,当美国与另一国之间有贸易往来时,美国就有基础期望甚至要求对方在国内的经济和政治体制上都与美国靠拢作为回应。而在中方看来,中国和美国在全球舞台上相处的理念是“和而不同”:一个国家与另外一个国家在国内政治经济体制上存在区别,这不应影响市场之间的正常贸易往来。

另外,在中国所承担的国际义务的议题上,双方分歧也越来越大在中方的地缘经济意识中,尽管中国整体的经济总量上升了,货物贸易量也上升了,但是我们认为自己依然是中等收入国家,所以只能承担与自身发展水平相匹配的市场开放义务。但以美国为代表的发达国家认为今日的中国与2001年加入WTO时完全不同,应该承担与中国经济体量及其潜力相当的国际义务。虽然不同的说法都有一定的道理,但两国思维上的差距越来越大,沟通时容易情绪化,并很难相互理解。如何缩小差距,这是未来进一步交流的重要目标。

纵观全局,中国应当以力戒虚妄的方式来应对美方和自己的忧虑应该意识到,贸易纠纷只是一种手段,是美国以“事”(敲打中国和其它贸易伙伴)谋“势”(美国继续全球领先)的一种技巧。美国和中国发展到今天,双方都已经不能完全改变彼此,各有各的自信基础,因而这种对抗性的情绪还会持续一段时间,甚至可能出现更激烈的忧虑的思潮。作为应对,我们应当邀请对方“相向而行”,做好要打长期交道的准备,万万不可以类似“修昔底德陷阱”(即:就剩“死磕到底”这一条出路了)的所谓规律性思维指导应对。

在这个过程中,一方面,中国应当时刻谨记以开放促发展这一成功经验,与包括美国在内的所有国家,谈成一项就要落实一项地开放,而不能是停留在口号性表述。另一方面,千万不可以用不能向美国低头为借口,让有损提高经济活力和国际竞争力的事发生

我想用一句话作为总结,德不孤,必有邻。 针对来自美国的压力,我们一不可照单全收,二不必举国反击,三无法与他国合纵连横,那么,我们(第四个选择)对美国做有限反制,我们的对外经济政策和国内的涉外经济举措,就必须是符合追求尽可能多方的利益的最大公约数这个大势。

(本文为北大国际关系学院査道炯教授在北大国发院第110次“朗润·格政”论坛“中美贸易摩擦新进展与应对策略”上的发言。)

 

Kim Jong-un Visits Beijing

A ChinaFile Conversation    March 28, 2018

At the invitation of Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chinese president, Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), paid an unofficial visit to China from March 25 to 28.

After two days of rumors, on Wednesday March 28, the official news agencies of China and North Korea announced that North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un had just completed a visit to Beijing. The “unofficial visit,” as Xinhua put it, was Kim’s first international trip since assuming power and an apparent surprise to much of the world. Amid much pageantry and with their wives taking part in the visit, Kim and Chinese Communist Party Secretary Xi Jinping both expressed commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. How should Beijing handle its relationship with North Korea? What does the visit augur for the future of North Korea’s nuclear program? And what does Kim’s meeting with Xi mean for Kim’s potential upcoming meetings with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump? —The Editors

Zha Daojiong

Quite conceivably, it was the appointment of the hawk John Bolton as Trump’s National Security Advisor that prompted Kim Jong-un to get on his late father’s rocket-proof train and make the journey to Beijing.

In the context of Trump’s take-no-prisoners approach to trade disputes and other matters, including his handling of the relationships with close U.S. neighbors Mexico and Canada, the North Koreans understandably got a bit nervous.

The timing of Kim’s trip to China leaves room for speculation on all fronts. Official accounts from both Chinese and North Korean sources speak in glowingly positive terms about the visit. Friendship cultivated by the ancestors of current leaders of both countries gets renewed. But if you compare official versions of such visits by Kim’s ancestors, especially his father’s visit, there is not that much that is truly groundbreaking.

With regard to the nuclear issue, it does seem that Kim Jong-un is making clear that he is prepared to see “denuclearization of the peninsula” (emphasis added by me). In the past, news reports, particularly those by Western media outlets, generally leave out reference to the peninsula. It is a mistake that is being repeated again.

Now, reference to the peninsula is where the complication begins. There are two actors in the southern part of the Korean peninsula: South Korea and the United States. Is North Korea expecting the U.S. to agree on and then follow through with a statement about what its military does in the future? For example, what if the United States stations nuclear submarines at the ports in the south?

For China, both North Korea and South Korea are neighbors that cannot move away. During the past year, China went along with the United States—though not exactly 100 percent—in applying economic sanctions on North Korea. It hurts what is normally called “traditional friendship” with the North. But, as Trump’s choice of action showed, China failed to earn much of any appreciation from the Trump White House: Beijing learned about Trump’s agreement to meet Kim from television news.

Kim’s trip to Beijing may generate a couple of days of media interest. But in the end, it is not going to make much of a dent in the dynamics. The drivers of the train of geopolitics on the Korean peninsula continue to be Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington.


查道炯: 对特朗普政府宣布加征钢铝关税的点评 

发表日期:2018-03-16    文章来源:北大汇丰海上丝路研究中心微信公众平台

我们没有理由将特朗普宣布对钢铝征税与中国的高级官员访美关联起来。那样做,反而会导致我们自己未来决策的情绪化(因为美方没有给中国特使“面子”)。假如美国要给中方颜色,它可能就不选择钢铝(因为美国从中国直接进口的比例不到前十位,没法让中方感受压力也没法向美国国内交待);美方威胁要为减少美中两国贸易不平衡采取行动并不是第一天,也没有必要再做什么试探、放什么气球。

从公开报道的特朗普团队针对各方的反应所给出的解释看,美方似乎是在诱使更多的外国钢铁公司将生产线搬迁到美国去。这与1980-1990年代美国针对从日本等国进口的轿车征收高额关税、公开施加政治压力的做法,源出一辙。而且,这次美方想诱导的重点目标,也不见得就是那些向美国出口粗钢的中资企业。一是美国的钢材消费市场对产品质量的要求比较高,二是出于“国家安全”的考虑,它对其盟国资本的企业去投资并就近供应(特别是那些涉及军品生产的钢材)更放心。此外,在特朗普政府在其国家战略报告中将中国明白无误地列为竞争对手的情形下,没有动力去冒其国内政治风险,将吸引中国的新投资作为目的。其实,2017年11月特朗普访华期间宣布的中方投资“大单”,美国方面从媒体到政界、学界,没有什么叫好的声音。

这次美国对钢铝加征关税,又一次提醒我们:中方必须形成新的共识,摒弃之前那种把特朗普和他领导的团队看作是一切为了做成一笔交易的商人的看法。

作为未来应对的一部分,中方倒是应该冷静分析一个现象:为什么中国在美国钢材进口中的比例那么小,但包括美国在内的几乎所有西方舆论都在突出中国。而且,主流西方舆论的基调就是中国确实该受到美国的敲打。近几年,中国的钢铝产量的大幅上升,给其他国家的同类企业造成了压力,这是市场因素在起作用,无关政治或外交偏好(是不是反华)。那么,中方自己在钢铝领域的去产能进展,为什么没有得到更为正面的理解?

中方在未来的国内产业政策研讨、决策、解释过程中,有必要更多地从“世界中的中国”这个角度,心平气和地分析国内和国外在某一行业、某一产品领域的“水涨船高”的竞争态势;审慎判断国际上对中国出口的容纳空间(特别是社会舆论空间);将国际间的可能反应做一些沙盘推演,而不是单纯地追求更大、更强。


When Trump and Kim Meet, What Will Xi Do?

A ChinaFile Conversation    March 13, 2018

Graffiti depicting Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un

On March 8, South Korea’s National Security Advisor announced that Donald Trump had agreed to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un by May. Although now-ousted Secretary of State Rex Tillerson previously downplayed the announcement, a summit between the two men could drastically change U.S. policy in Asia. How does this affect China’s interests in the region? And how would Beijing feel about a Trump-Kim summit? —The Editors 

Zha Daojiong

A Kim-Trump meeting opens a window of opportunity for the international community to shift its hopes away from China taking “responsibility” for North Korea’s nuclear behavior and toward asking Washington to do its fair share.

Under Trump, United States officials adopt an extreme position relative to American security research elites who for decades have argued that recent Chinese success was made in the United States. They argue that Washington aided China by letting it into the World Trade Organization and by using the U.S. Navy to keep the Indian and Pacific oceans open for shipping in and out of Chinese ports.

In exchange, Washington exhibits a sense of moral high ground by expecting China to implement North Korea-related policies Washington decides alone or in consultation with Tokyo and/or Seoul.

China was surprised when Trump made North Korea a key topic in his first meeting with President Xi in April 2017. Beijing has long argued that North Korea is a sovereign nation that pursues its own foreign and defense policies.

When Trump called Xi a week later, again over North Korea, it was yet another affirmation of the end of Obama-era strategic patience with Pyongyang. But isn’t Trump’s impatience equally directed at Beijing? Is America’s Korea policy establishment ignorant about the limits of Chinese influence over North Korean behavior?

Viewed from China, North Korea is NOT an area in which the Obama administration failed to act. After all, under Obama, the U.S. deployed to South Korea its military’s most powerful high altitude antimissile defense system (THAAD).

THAAD was the single issue that managed to reverse the goodwill generated between Beijing and Seoul at the start of the Park Geun-hye administration in February 2013. Park was the only head of state from an OECD country to attend the September 2015 military parade in Beijing commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. The United States successfully lobbied virtually all of its key allies to boycott the parade.

The Kim-Trump meet-up is difficult to forecast. A bit of history is useful. It’s often forgotten that when the U.S. reached an arrangement with Pyongyang in 1994 for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, China was not invited to participate, either in the diplomatic process or in the ensuing aid-for-freeze arrangement under the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) program. The KEDO process stumbled for 10 years, both on the ground and in diplomatic terms. It was only after Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in January 2003, marking the complete failure of all preceding efforts, that China was asked to be part of the multilateral effort to entice Pyongyang to change its behavior.

A preferred outcome of the Kim-Trump meet-up would be a lessening of tensions that enabled average Westerners to travel to North Korea to see the society for themselves. First-hand knowledge could help counter-balance the portrayal—with a heavy dose of Western imagination and propaganda—of China’s influence over North Korea.

 

Is American Policy toward China Due for a ‘Reckoning’?

A ChinaFile Conversation    FEBRUARY 15, 2018

A worker holds a U.S. flag on Tiananmen Square in Beijing ahead of a visit by U.S. President Barack Obama on Nov.16, 2009.

In a February 13 Foreign Affairs essay, former diplomats Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner argue that United States policy toward China, in administrations of both parties, has relied in the past on a mistaken confidence in America’s ability to “mold China to the United States’ liking.” They call for a new U.S. approach to China, one which faces the degree to which China’s actions have diverged from U.S. expectations, discards the notion that economic liberalization would lead China to political openness, and acknowledges China’s failure to acquiesce to an American-led security order. Is Campell and Ratner’s characterization of the shortcomings in the U.S. approach persuasive? What should a newly clear-eyed U.S. policy entail? —The Editors

Zha Daojiong

Prosperity without freedom is just another form of poverty.” That statement in former President Barak Obama’s remarks to the Australian parliament in November 2011, to lay out his case for a ‘pivot,’ rang loud enough for some concerned Southeast Asian observers—privately, of course—to express a sense of exasperation when conferring with us Chinese scholars.

After all, if there is one achievement in which contemporary China can take legitimate pride, poverty reduction is it. Imports from other countries—including raw materials from poor and developing economies—function as a means of poverty reduction more broadly. Yes, there is a whole host of issues, environmental and human rights along the way, but isn’t that a component of the global chain of production in the first place? What was the United States demanding China’s trading partners to choose between?

The level of continuity—both in philosophizing and policy designs— between the Trump Administration’s China strategy and that of the Obama Administration is extremely high. Some observers erroneously point to the withdrawal from the Tran-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as an indicator of major difference. The TPP, not submitted to Congress for ratification, was facing serious domestic obstacles anyway. Along the way, the degree of a China factor therein is very much a subject for academic guess work.

On the China side, President Xi is quoted having observed during his first meeting with President Trump that, “We have a thousand reasons to get China-U.S. relations right and not one reason to spoil the relationship.”

President Xi Jinping talks with his US counterpart Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago state in Palm Beach, Florida, US, April 6, 2017. 

It is not that Americans and Chinese across the board disagree with the wording itself. Real differences exist over who the “we” are, who is doing the “spoiling,” and what is “right.” Well, this is not the first time such differences exist and it sure won’t be the last time either.

No matter how the debate went on the U.S. side, since the re-normalization of diplomatic ties with Washington, China has benefited from having a stable relationship. There can be no question about that.

Now, has China short changed the United States in the process? With the U.S. so firmly committed to keeping Taiwan a separate entity from the mainland, it would be politically suicidal for any Chinese leadership to publicly express gratitude to the United States. When leadership in Beijing emerges through multi-party, competitive and free elections, will the Taiwan issue logically go the American way? Well, some political science textbooks say so. But neither Beijing nor Washington is taking any chance.

Other than the Taiwan issue, it is truly hard for anyone in China to truly justify pursuing a policy towards the U.S.—bilaterally, regionally, or globally—that is confrontational by nature.

China has benefited from being open to influence—designed or not —from the United States. This is an unspoken yet powerful fact, accepted by millions of Chinese, those in the leadership included. There are facets in that influence that China does not accept or will take time to accept. But the notion of China working to upstage the United States is just too fanciful to be taken seriously.

There certainly is an element of competition, which in turn is a useful means against complacency. As a matter of fact, I see the ongoing discussion among American security elites about U.S. policy towards China as a living example of a society that has a long history against complacency. There are useful things for China to learn from such a trait in American civilization.

 

US defence strategy is not news to China

EAST ASIA FORUM    February 11, 2018

‘China is a disruptive, transitional force in the Indo-Pacific’. So declared United States Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris at a recent Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) conference in New Delhi. On the same day, United States Secretary of Defense James Mattis unveiled the United States’ new defence strategy in Washington. Thus far Beijing has reacted with a shrug of the shoulder.

Members of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) take part in the national flag-raising ceremony to mark the New Year in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, 1 January 2018 (Photo: Reuters/Stringer).

It is not difficult to understand the United States’ characterisation of China as ‘disruptive’ — it repeats US insistence on maintaining its own continuous primacy in the regional and global order. Over the past two centuries, the United States has frequently branded aspects of the Chinese civilization as disruptive of its definition of the international order.

What is Harris’s ‘transitional force’ meant to imply? Must the United States now work to set China on a different ‘path of transition’ that is more forcefully conditioned by the United States and its allies? Is China now seen as a force of transition that other states will be required to follow? What exactly is in transition?

The latest US defence strategy document defines China as a ‘revisionist power’ — one that is uncomfortable with the terms of the order as dictated by Washington and its allies . The primary focus of US national security is said to have shifted from a platform focused on curbing spread of terror to one of prioritising ‘great-power competition’ with countries such as China.

Even when anti-terrorism was the central focus of the declared US defence strategy, competing against China was still seen as paramount. Successive US governments refused to extradite those Chinese nationals who were arrested by US forces in Afghan battlefields. The US government determined that honouring the wishes of detainees cleared for release was more important than letting Chinese police authorities have access to them as a means of dealing with terror in their own part of the world. Nobody in the US security establishment has explicitly said that their country differentiated acts of terror by the victims, but the message can hardly be lost on anyone.

Viewed from China, the particularities of style that come with the Trump team say very little about changes in US strategy. US security elites across the ideological spectrum have for decades argued that the pillars of recent Chinese success are made in the United States. They argue that Washington carved this path by letting China into the World Trade Organization and that it continues to facilitate China’s success by providing their navies to help keep the Indian and Pacific oceans open for shipping in and out of Chinese ports.

Washington deems these points to be facts, while Chinese security analysts often see them as opinions. Does the difference really matter? A sensible response irrespective of opinion is that neither side can afford to rock the boat. Both sides need to find ways to peacefully co-exist with one another.

The angst that the Trump team is projecting over China has a precedent in former president Reagan’s ‘city on a hill’ imagery back in the early 1980s — the bottom line being that the United States risks falling behind other nations. Thirty years ago, the United States took issue with its then main trade competitor: Japan. This included questioning Japan’s economic system and practices. It is little coincidence that a Reagan-era trade policy veteran is picked today as United States Trade Representative — Robert Lighthizer’s first major act in office is to activate ‘Super 301’ investigations against China, similar to those he launched against Japan years ago.

A more thorough line of ideological debate is at work. For many in Washington, China was meant to develop a multi-party political system in exchange for its access to the commodity and financial markets of liberal democracies. Its perceived failing to achieve this yet is the means by which the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific quadrilateral’ became attractive to some players in the region. Official Chinese ideology rejects that logic of causation. Some in China even risk overselling the purportedly unique (with an implication of superior) Chinese approach to governance.

Still, does China not have a right to choose its own path of development? So long as China is not imposing its system of governance as a precondition of aid, trade and investment — which it is not — what makes the China’s situation so unacceptable?

It should not be hard to recall the policy rhetoric in decades gone past that talked of ‘East Asian models of capitalism’ or ‘Asian values’. Such discussions came and went, mostly due to management challenges common to all economic systems. Nobody has the final say on any governance system or its keys to success.

When it comes to grand strategy, both the United States and China have built up their respective echo chambers that are comfortable to domestic constituencies. From ‘pivot’ to ‘rebalancing’ and now to ‘Indo-Pacific’, the US chamber seems to be enlarging, although still with some level of uncertainty.

At the end of the day, a civilisation becomes stronger by opening itself up to competition. This is a long-term goal. In the short term, conflict avoidance ought to prevail across the Pacific and Indian oceans. The collective wisdom emanating from the societies of Quad countries should have no problem keeping the occasional bursts of hostile rhetoric in perspective and maintaining the status quo. It goes without saying that China would have the most to lose should it mistakenly and foolishly fail to put the ongoing Quad rhetoric in proper perspective and should it fail to avoid knowingly aggravate Quad countries’ feelings of uncertainty.

 

査道炯:南海地区功能性合作——中国的视角

发表日期:2018-01-31    文章来源:北大汇丰海上丝路研究中心微信公众平台

摘要:2010年以来,南海相关问题已经占据地区外交事务的重要甚至是中心地位。从推动地区外交朝着良性互动的角度看,如何降低南海问题对本地区外交所造成的困扰,很值得继续探讨。地缘政治逻辑的方式没有获得其支持者期待的积极收益,转向功能性合作或许能够对通过划界解决南海争端产生直接影响。本文的假设是,相较于信任,信心更足的参与方将更看重合作的价值,倡议南海各方将渔业和民用航空作为“先易后难”合作的可能领域,以此作为寻求减少对抗的一种解决方案。

关键词:南海 功能性合作 渔业 民用航空

南海争端长期困扰着中国与一些东南亚国家之间的政治关系。2010年以来,南海相关问题已经占据地区外交事务重要甚至是中心地位,这令众多观察家困惑不已。南海主权和权益争端各方有许多机会反复重申自己的主张,相互之间讨价还价,同时,各方都试图赢得公众舆论的支持。从推动地区外交朝着良性互动的角度看,如何缓解南海问题对本地区外交所造成的困扰,有必要拓展新思维继续探讨。

一、功能性合作与地缘政治挑战

与世界其他地区的问题类似,南海所有的利益攸关方面临的核心挑战主要有两类:功能性挑战和地缘政治挑战。与此同时,用分类词汇确认这些挑战相对容易,但要在采取什么行动、如何确定行动步骤来应对挑战等问题上达成共识则非常艰难。自2009年以来,我们不难观察到,东亚正趋向于选择从地缘政治的视角去思考并设计与南海(以及整个亚洲海洋)相关的政策。

的确,对于研究当代东亚海洋外交的学者来说,当论及南海国家层面的互动时,这一地区还没有解决“先有鸡还是先有蛋”的问题之争,即功能性合作与战略信任谁该为先(谁是先决基础和条件)的问题。学界中有一派的观点认为功能性合作是构建信任(提升信任)的措施,另一派则认为,没有战略信任,即便有所构想的功能性合作,也不可能得到推进。

如何确定“合作—信任”等式里两者的顺位是一个难题,这可能已经超越了亚洲和平与和解委员会(Asian Peace and Reconciliation Council,APRC)的目标。本文的假设是,相较于信任,信心更足的参与方将更看重合作的价值。

二、功能性合作的案例

可以说,2010年7月在越南河内举行的第十七届东盟地区论坛外长会(ASEAN Regional Forum,ARF)促成以地缘政治为主流视角来审视南海问题。然而从那时起,以地缘政治主导解决南海领土争端,就成了东盟主导的外交擂台上唯一突出的议题。这增加了我们对东盟忘记其促进地区繁荣和凝聚力的根本使命的担忧。并且,尽管2015年正式建立了东盟经济共同体,但自2011年以来,东亚峰会也从早期强调经济和功能性合作转向了政治与安全议题。

很难预见南海问题的前景,但未来应该是现状的延续。没有任何一方对地缘政治主导南海问题和地区其他议题所导致的结果感到满意。

于是,许多专家和观察家提出另外一种解决南海争端的方式,即南海问题利益攸关方参与功能性合作。这种观点并无新意,放眼东亚,众多认知共同体都已倡导并实践功能性合作。

然而,何谓“功能性合作”?在东盟的既有文本中,1992年第四届东盟首脑会议发布的《新加坡宣言》提出了11个合作领域,这些领域包括人力资源发展、环境合作(尤其是跨境污染、自然灾害、森林防火和热带木材保护)、以及打击跨国犯罪和预防传染病等。

在某种程度上,在东盟的话语中,“功能性合作”创造性地替代了如国际发展方面的“能力建设”这类词。笔者认为,上述合作的“功能”维度,指的是合作目标是帮助加强东盟内部凝聚力,而不仅是为提高成员国各自的国家安全和社会福利。

从那时起,东盟取得了长足的发展,“东盟中心”理念帮助提升了整个地区的韧性水平。东盟的实践证明了对东盟持怀疑态度是错误的,尤其是对东盟与亚太及其他地区的主要外交对象打交道能力的怀疑。东盟内部功能性合作的收益无疑已经超越东盟组织本身,外溢到其他地区。

东盟(兼指东盟整体或某个成员国)与中国之间的众多合作项目可以被视为“功能性合作”项目。许多项目可以追溯至中国与东盟成员国,以及与东盟建立正式外交关系之前。功能性合作是以智慧为支撑基础,证据之一是思想库网络组织的建立。这个思想库网络组织在东盟与中日韩“10+3”领导人峰会上得到正式承认,它作为连接东亚思想库网络、政府和企业的知识桥梁,促进三方的互动。该组织致力于研究东亚合作中的关键性问题,为地区一体化提出战略性观点和具体的政策建议,向“10+3”领导人峰会提交政策报告。

《南海各方行为宣言》(Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, DOC)的第六条规定:有关各方可探讨或开展合作,主要领域为海洋环境保护、葡京集团研究、海上航行和交通安全、搜寻与救助,以及打击跨国犯罪——包括但不限于打击毒品走私、海盗和海上武装抢劫,以及非法军火交易。

《南海各方行为宣言》第六条的文本开篇就指明“在全面和永久解决争端之前”,但是这一运作方式并未妨碍2004年中国—东盟联合工作组为落实《南海各方行为宣言》而建立。工作组的主要任务是为促进合作提供建议。

《南海各方行为宣言》第六条还规定,“在具体实施之前,有关各方应就双边及多边合作的模式、范围和地点取得一致意见。”这可以被理解为一项政治性的保障措施,即合作中出现所有权争议时,要认识到合作项目关联着合作各方的国内复杂性。

《联合国海洋法公约》(United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,UNCLOS)要求其签约国履行开发和保护海洋和海洋相关资源的义务。所有的国际法都规定,一个国家开发利用资源的权利伴随合作保护和保存资源的义务。所有南海沿岸国家都签署了《联合国海洋法公约》,因此这些国家有法定义务寻求与其他成员国进行合作。

总而言之,在海洋领土划界问题上不管是取得进展还是未能达成协议,南海沿岸国家之间合作的功能性维度应该是通过睦邻友好体现或确定国家利益,这可以说是解决领土争端最实际的参考建议。这是在进行权利与授权的法理推定之前的常识性考量,换而言之,在思考各方可享有的涉海权益时,有必要将常识放在比法律条文论证更高的地位。为什么常识这么重要?因为过去数年我们在这个地区所见的,以地缘政治理论为基础的尝试并没有收获其倡导者所预期的积极收益和红利。虽然转向功能性合作未必一定能对解决南海划界争端产生直接影响,但是很难认为坚持现有的解决路径能有理想的出路。

三、多方“先易后难”开展合作的可能领域

正如前面所观察到的,功能性合作有其自身的复杂性。为了使专家的建议具有可行性,认同合作价值的人提出“先易后难”的运作建议。但是,对于一方来说的“易”,对于另外一方就可能会很“难”。由此就体现出建立“亚洲和平与和解委员会”(Asia's Peace and Reconciliation Commission,APRC)这类机构和平台进行对话和商讨的必要性和价值。

我们在共同探索南海地区功能性合作的领域,以下是我根据个人的学术观察列出的值得注意的问题。南海海域和在海域上空活动的政府、公司和个人等所有有关各方,有责任致力于在海洋开发中促进海事安全和保护海洋资源,乃至于南海沿岸国家均须发挥功能性项目参与者和组织者的作用。

国际机构(尤其是联合国框架下的专门机构)一直在为推动功能性合作产生并成为主流做着力所能及的工作。应该邀请、鼓励这些国际组织参与功能性合作并长期发挥积极作用。在近年来地缘政治困扰加剧的背景下,特别是在受国内环境因素影响,功能性合作受到质疑的时候,专业的国际组织能够提供必要的政治掩护。

(一)渔业

在南海海域,与复杂的主权主张和其他形式的管辖权争端同时存在的是,过度捕捞,非法、未报告和不管制(Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated,IUU)捕捞,以及海洋生物栖息环境被破坏的问题。尤其是IUU捕捞还给从事渔业的群体带来了非常严重的污名,造成南海沿岸渔业收益的净损失。

同时,对于所有南海沿岸国来说,解决IUU捕捞问题的任务都很艰巨,在许多情况下,必须进行高层次承诺的国际合作。例如,现存的便利港口使得IUU捕捞变得更容易。对于渔业来说,“便利港口”是指只有很少甚至没有标准和程序来确保只有合法捕捞所得可以上岸或进行转运的港口。

国际社会频繁呼吁南海沿岸的国家一道解决共同的问题,但是领土争端和历史仇恨已经给政府间海事和渔业问题上的合作造成巨大障碍。

理想的方式是,渔业领域的功能性合作应该以发展协商一致的方法开始,来建立解决IUU捕捞问题的案例。需要制定联合行动方案来建立完整的操作链条证据,包括标识、人员招募、融资和终端销售,等等。各个国家的国内执法机构需要与外交官员和法律专家相互配合、联合行动。

其次,联合国粮食与农业组织 (UN Food and Agriculture Organization,FAO)领导的《关于港口国预防、制止和消除IUU捕捞的措施的协定》(Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing,PSM)于2016年6月开始生效。PSM协议是打击IUU捕捞的工具,在过去10年,使港口国家强化管制的重要作用不断凸显。日益依赖港口国来打击不可持续的捕捞行为,在很大程度上是由于船旗国未能有效地管理那些悬挂其国旗的渔船的捕捞作业。

PSM是由港口国制定的要求或采取的干预措施,外国渔船必须遵守,这是其使用港口国境内港口的一项条件。国家PSM通常包括入港事先通知、指定港口使用、入港和鱼品上岸/转运限制、补给和服务限制、文件要求和港口检查,以及诸如IUU渔船入黑名单、贸易相关措施和制裁措施等。许多此类措施近几年被纳入和成为国际惯例。

目前只有五个西太平洋国家加入了PSM,将PSM作为管理南海渔业的指导原则还有讨论空间,这只是学者建议采纳的政策工具,我们在亚洲不妨先看一看世界上其它地区是如何管理类似纠纷的。

为了保护人们的生计,尤其是沿海地区居民的生计,是时候开展基于传统捕鱼权(如《联合国海洋法公约》第51条所列)的合作。在这一方面,已有大量适当的双边合作机制,其中有的已经延续数十年。应该评估一下这些机制安排所取得的成就与教训,更确切地说,要评估这种双边合作的机制能否能够延伸到多边合作领域。

最后还有重要的一点,就是为了提升南海渔民运营的安全,政府应该与国际组织一道,合作提高捕捞作业的安全性。

(二)民用航空

2014年3月8日,发生了从吉隆坡飞往北京的马来西亚航空370客机(MH370)的悲剧性事件。应该将这次事件作为推进民用航空国际合作的警示,以提高民用航空的安全。

不论南海国家最终如何划定海洋边界线,民用航空安全是各方须遵守的国际法律义务,符合各方利益。航空业专家一致认为必须提高飞机跟踪系统的稳定性。正如MH370事故所体现出来的,一种名为“广播式自动独立监视ADS-B”的飞机实时跟踪设备已存在多年, 但只有60%的商用飞机配置了这一设备。为什么?原因是财务负担已经不堪重负的航空行业难以承担额外的成本。无论如何,至关重要的是,航空公司要解决驾驶舱跟踪系统和黑匣子可以手动关闭这一技术问题。

这里的重点不在于MH370事件本身,而是需要鼓励整个南海地区的国家政府开展合作,共同制定统一的技术和操作要求,来实时跟踪所有商业航班,特别是那些穿越南海空域的航班。

事实上,南海地区已被证明是世界上商业航空发展最快的地区之一。行业报告显示,在未来20年内,东盟国家内部的空中旅行每年可能增长6.5%,而全球的平均增速为4.9%。

东盟单一航空市场政策(ASEAN Single Aviation Market Policy,ASEAN-SAM)通过在单一、统一的航空市场实现航空服务自由化,允许东盟国家航空公司在东盟地区自由飞行,来促进地区和国家互联互通,整合生产性网络以及提高地区贸易便利化水平。

随着更多的飞机在空中飞行,实时报告和处理数据与通信网络提供的关键飞行信息可以帮助减少拥堵,节约周转时间,并确保更可靠的飞行跟踪行动。到目前为止,商业服务可供航空公司订购,但出于众所周知的原因,这些服务仍不能提供充分的预警措施。

像中国的北斗卫星导航系统这样的卫星服务能够并且应该成为提高民用航空安全的工具。此外,中国与东盟国家应加强民用航空的技术和业务合作,乘客的安全才是真正重要的。

四、小结

关于南海地区功能性合作的讨论是中国与东盟关系安全层面的一部分。重要的是要关注对该地区安全图景的不同评估,以及南海地区各方不安全感的来源。一个看似巧妙的假设认为,东盟国家可以通过与美国建立更紧密的军事安全关系,与中国建立经贸合作关系,来获取美国的军事保护和中国的经济福利,这是更为安全的选择。这种观点听起来蛮有吸引力的,但它是一个虚假的论断。简单地说,包括南海问题在内,东盟地区没有能够促使中国和美国走向正面军事冲突的物质或者其它的诱惑。

因此,应该通过提高非军事用途的海上安全,继续加强海上空间的安全合作。这确实应该包括:在追踪海盗和袭击方面继续合作,在起诉破坏国际和国内法律的违规者方面合作。在打击海洋跨国犯罪的问题上,东亚国家可以利用其打击非法毒品贩运的先例,即一国在行使其司法权起诉任何国籍的毒品罪犯时不会受到另一国的干预。

东盟和中国从过去的功能合作得出的短期经验是:尽管彼此存在分歧,但双方仍然应该继续履行合作承诺。这种合作可能不会消除领土所有权主张方面的差异,但至少,它应该是寻求减少对抗的一种解决方案。 

Functional Cooperation in the South China Sea Region: a Chinese Perspective

Abstract: For the past five years or so, reference to the South China Sea (SCS) has been occupying a level of centrality in regional diplomacy that leaves many observers perplexed. The way of geopolitical rationales just does not yield positive as promised by their proponents,a turn to focus on functional cooperation may have a direct impact on dispute resolution over boundary delimitation. This article’s assumption is that participants come with a higher level of confidence in giving weight to the value of cooperation ahead that of trust. Proposing parties in the South China Sea take fisheries and civil aviation as possible “Low Hanging Fruit” areas,which makes the search for a solution less antagonistic.

Key Words: South China Sea;Functional Cooperation;Fisheries;Civil Aviation

 

中美关系︱谁怕唐纳德?特朗普

发表日期:2018-01-25    文章来源:澎湃新闻

2018年初的中美关系风兼雨。如何管理?

1 不必自乱阵脚。就美国政府对华政策的基础性框架而言,特朗普时期没有也不会发生变化。

特朗普政府对华政策的基本面,仅仅是风格有所不同而已,基本延续了自第一任小布什以来的传统。

简言之,有三方面:1)怀疑(克林顿时期实施的)“通过拉中国进入美国主导的国际经济体系,来诱导中国改变其国内经济与政治制度”这一逻辑是否成立。2)试探中国寻求强大的最终目的是不是将美国从东亚撵走。3)决心挫败中国实现国家完全统一的努力。

非得说有什么变化的话,或许在于:特朗普政府尚未(公开地)挑战中国中央政府在香港、西藏、新疆的管治;(还)不那么热心声援中国的“民主人士”。

2 特朗普个人关于中国的表述,就是美国(朝野、政商)建制派、不分党派的主流精英们的观点。

换而言之,在对华政策的基础性逻辑方面,特朗普不是什么另类,而是一种“话糙理不糙”。精英们认可“谋求美国复兴”的战略目标,只是在是否以“美国优先”为外交口号上有不同看法。

3 美国行政当局的执行力,也是建制派的普遍关注。

紧接着奥巴马,特朗普是美国第二位没有经营州、市一级政府经验的行政部门最高首长。而联邦政府行政当局的执行力是国家发展和振兴所不可或缺的。特朗普执政这一年,打破传统党派界限在国会拉票,从驱逐非法移民、税改,到推出基建方案、国家战略报告,无不有证明其“言必行”的执政能力的一面。其间,当然也得到了从立法到司法系统,乃至宗教力量的配合。

4 这种执行力,体现在对外政策上,就成了“美国不能输”。

先看朝鲜问题。一个拥有核武的朝鲜,对美国(本土或海外利益)构不成现实威胁,因为美国反击的力量是毋庸置疑的。但朝鲜若用核武(胁迫)统一半岛,那么美国被驱赶离开是可能的前景之一。在这两个极端之间,朝鲜不间断地口头威胁美国,造成了后者威信(面子)上的压力。

所以,美国对朝鲜:1)不谈、不打;2)利用朝核问题迫使中国在其它方面对美国做出让步;3)转身让美国百姓相信是中国不让美国赢得与朝鲜的斗争。美国因此而处于最有利的灵活外交位置。

朝鲜问题不是“美国输了”的首要标志,甚至不是必要的标志。“中国赢了冷战结束以来的大国竞争”,才是“美国输了”这枚硬币的另一面。1985年通过迫使日本签订“广场协议”,美国成功管理了一个对其引领(primacy)地位的挑战。而今天的中国以及中美关系的战略基础,却不可能让美国有重复历史的选择。

尽管从中方的视角感觉不可理喻,“不能让中国赢了”就等于“不能让美国输了”。

5 处理美中双边贸易所伴生的政治挑战,美方既有咄咄逼人的一面,也难掩黔驴技穷的一面。

跨入2018年,美方媒体不断放风,朝野不断派员来北京,要求重视特朗普当局即将推出的惩罚中国的贸易措施,饱含某种“都是为了中国好”、“为了两国关系稳定发展”的“谆谆劝告”。言外之意:特朗普是阻挡不住的,挑战其行事逻辑,也是不明智的。

倘若中国主动提出“自愿出口限制”(voluntary export restraint, VER)清单, 则有利于美当局在其国内塑造“美国赢了”的政治舆论,至少阶段性如此。实际上,中国在2017年7月初汉堡G20期间就钢铁去产能所提出的方案,本质上就是某种VER。两周后的中美全面经济对话上,美方没能巩固这一成果。

特朗普当局针对中国输美钢铁的“特别301”调查措施是在没有企业向政府提出反倾销请求,援引1992年美国国内立法为依据,而展开的。因为中国在2001年加入WTO,针对时下的被调查,是否可援引WTO相关规则来在多边机制下反制美国的做法,是一个贸易法律问题。现实情形是,美方执意要做,中方确实无法阻挡。

其实,这不是第一次美方单边主义行为。例如,即便是在极力倡导多边合作的奥巴马政府期间,美方因抱怨IMF改革方案对中国有利而拒绝执行。国际间对此举的反应之一,便是支持中国牵头设立的亚洲基础设施投资银行。

有理不在声高。应对特朗普政府在2018年“不得不对中国晓以利害”的架势,中方应坚持多边框架下达成的不歧视原则,冷静回应。这样做,才能收获“德有邻,必不孤”的效应。

同时,中国有必要着重管理中美双边贸易相关的政治挑战(即:如何向国内外、两国之外的‘利益相关方’说明自己行为和选择的逻辑)。例如,美方常常挂在嘴边的“对等”(reciprocity),到底如何体现,是某产品在对方市场的占有率?投资的存量、增量?还是投资准入的审批条件?如此等等。就是很值得接过的话题。

总之,以“让利”为手段的采购、投资项目,金额再大,其经济外交收效是有限的,中方有必要加强研究如何与美方在处理贸易争端的政治逻辑、道德制高点上对接。这种对接,也许说服不了美方改变做法,但应该有利于思辨自己的做法,有利于扩大、巩固自己的经贸朋友圈。

 

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